25. september 2019

Ekspert advarer mod at forfølge Trump/Ukraine-spor: Biden ser ikke det ’som en ubetinget vindersag’

Jeg har ikke tal på hvor mange gange de danske medier har talt om Trumps forestående rigsretssag, og jeg tvivler på at det nogensinde sker. Anders Agner Pedersen fra mediet Kongressen, advarer dog at det kan give bagslag i forhold til Joe Biden, da ‘Trump-venlige medier’ vil bruge eventuelle afsløringer om Bidens søn.

En uvant vinkel fra BT – Ekspert: Joe Biden kan blive den helt store taber på Trump-sagen.

“… én ting er sikkert: Den formodentlige demokratiske præsidentkandidat Joe Biden må være ganske bekymret over det ubehagelige lys, som Donald Trump har kastet på hans søn, Hunter. Det vurderer ekspert i amerikansk politik Anders Agner Pedersen fra specialmediet Kongressen.

‘Den lidt oversete del i alt det her er, at vi skal huske på, at der er en herre ved navn Joe Biden, der ikke ser det her som en ubetinget vindersag,’ siger han.

‘I de politiske kredse har man talt meget om, at Hunter er farmands akilleshæl. Han har nogle lig i lasten og et blakket ry,’ siger Anders Agner Pedersen.

I sin tid som vicepræsident i Obama-administrationen brugte Joe Biden meget tid i Ukraine på et pleje nationens diplomatiske relationer. Sønnen, Hunter Biden, har også haft interesse i Ukraine. I 2014 blev han en del af virksomheden Burismas bestyrelse. Burisma er et af landets største gasfirmaer. Det blev han ifølge mediet NPR betalt et beløb svarende til 335.000 kroner om måneden for.”

Oploadet Kl. 14:02 af Kim Møller — Direkte link61 kommentarer


28. februar 2017

Politiken: Tre forskere undsiger East StratCom-konklusion : “… er på grænsen til desinformation.”

Forleden blev jeg kontaktet af en universitetsunderviser, der ville høre hvorvidt jeg kendte bloggeren Jesper Larsen, der blev betegnet som en russisk påvirkningsagent. Hans ‘omfattende researchmateriale’ er grunden til at Politiken i dag kan rette hård kritik af East StratCom med disclaimeren: “Alle oplysninger i artiklen er kontrolleret af Politiken, som også har foretaget egen research.” Intet er sandt før det har stået i Politiken, som man siger.

Blandt East StratComs kilder er ukrainske ‘InformNapalm’ (‘Vi brænder fjenden med informations-napalm!’), der samarbejder tæt med ‘Myrotvorets’, som sidste år offentliggjorde en liste over 4.500 ‘terroristkollaboratører’, udenlandske journalister. På anden liste figurerer mere end 100.000 pro-russiske landsforrædere og terrorister.

Fra Politiken – EU er fanget i propaganda-krigens tåger (af John Hansen og Thomas Heine).

“For en lille måned siden var der pludselig krig igen i det østlige Ukraine. Ikke blot de daglige skudvekslinger, der er fortsat trods en nu to år gammel våbenhvileaftale mellem Kijev-regeringen og de Moskva-støttede separatister. Men rigtig krig, frem for alt omkring byen Avdijivka, der ligger på den Kijev-kontrollerede side tæt på frontlinjen. …

Efter 6 dage faldt tingene omtrent lige så pludseligt til ro igen, tilbage til de rutinemæssige krænkelser af våbenhvilen fra begge sider. Imens beskyldte man vanen tro hinanden for at være skurken.

En række vestlige medier rapporterede, at det var separatisterne, der introducerede det tunge skyts mod beboede områder. Men modsat fortalte en række vestlige og ukrainske medier om måneder med ’snigende ukrainsk offensiv’ frem mod den såkaldte kontaktlinje mellem parterne – blandt dem den statsfinansierede amerikanske Radio Free Europe og den engelsksprogede ukrainske Kyiv Post.

OSCE-observatørerne dokumenterede, hvad de kunne i deres daglige rapporter. Uden at placere skylden hos én af parterne.

(Avdiivka-konklusion i Disinformation Review, 9. februar 2017; Grafik: East StratCom)

East StratCom Task Force – et EU-kontor med 11 ansatte, hvis hovedopgave er at bekæmpe russiske myter og desinformation – var imidlertid ikke i tvivl.

I sit ugentlige Disinformation Review 9. februar havde man Avdijivka som tophistorie og oplyste i en infografik: ‘Hvad pro-Kreml-medier sagde: Der er ingen russiske styrker på landjorden. Hvad der faktisk skete: Russisk-støttede militante begyndte at beskyde ukrainske positioner’.

I det følgende Disinformation Review 16. februar henviste East StratCom fire gange til det foregående ugebrev for at affærdige russiske påstande om, at Ukraine fremprovokerede volden i Avdijivka. ‘Ikke Ukraine, men Rusland og russiskstøttede militante har forværret situationen i Avdijivka’, hed det.

Tre forskere, der følger udviklingen i det østlige Ukraine tæt, afviser over for Politiken, at man med nogen rimelighed kan udpege én af parterne som ansvarlig for Avdijivka-optrapningen: Balazs Jarabik, en Ukraine-ekspert tilknyttet den amerikanske tænketank Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Flemming Splidsboel Hansen, seniorforsker ved Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier, og Claus Mathiesen, lektor ved Forsvarsakademiet.

‘Det er så forenklet i forhold til realiteterne, at det mindst er på grænsen til desinformation’, siger Balazs Jarabik om East StratComs infografik.

‘East StratCom udelader, hvad ukrainerne foretager sig. Så enkelt er det. Det virker, som om mange af folkene bag dette Disinformation Review føler, at det er deres mission at støtte de ukrainske magthavere’, mener Jarabik, der ellers som udgangspunkt ser EU-kontoret som »et nyttigt initiativ’.”

Oploadet Kl. 10:05 af Kim Møller — Direkte link5 kommentarer


11. august 2014

Karen Hækkerup: “Der er jo også unge mennesker…”, som kunne finde på at kriges i Ukraine og Israel

Forleden var det SF’s retsordfører Karina Lorentzen, der sagde noget lignende. Justitsminister Karen Hækkerup hælder vand ud af ørerne i Politiken – Hækkerup: Radikaliserede unge vender også blikket mod Ukraine og Israel.

“Flere end 100 danske statsborgere har deltaget i væbnede kampe i Syrien, siden borgerkrigen brød ud. Men ifølge justitsminister Karen Hækkerup (S) risikerer problemet med kamplystne, radikaliserede unge at vokse sig langt større:

‘Vi har set ting, som gør, at vi er opmærksomme på, at der er mennesker, som også ønsker at tage til andre dele af verden for at kæmpe, og det er vi selvfølgelig lige så interesserede i at følge’, siger hun til Politiken.

Der er jo også unge mennesker, som højst sandsynligt kigger på muligheden for at tage til Ukraine, Israel eller slutte sig til Islamisk Stat (islamistisk bevægelse tidligere kendt som Isis, som kæmper for at oprette et islamisk kalifat på tværs af Irak og Syrien, red.), så det breder sig lidt. Man skal holde øje med, hvor folk ellers tager hen i verden’.

Karen Hækkerup understreger, at hun ikke har konkrete eksempler på danskere, der er taget af sted til en af de nævnte konflikter…

Oploadet Kl. 23:16 af Kim Møller — Direkte link9 kommentarer


5. marts 2014

Samuel P. Huntington om Ukraines kulturelle splittelse (’96): “The forces of repulsion drive them apart…”

Alle har en mening om konflikten i Ukraine, og det virker som det politiske etablissement tror man kan tale en vestlig universalisme frem, stik imod historiske erfaringer og geopolitisk virkelighed. I sidste ende handler det om kultur. Samuel P. Huntington satte ord på kulturens betydning i storværket The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996), hvor han blandt andet beskrev hvorledes Ukraine var et splittet land, qua sin beliggenhed på brudfladen mellem det vestlig-katolske Europa og det østlig-ortodokse Rusland.

Enkelte debattører har trukket Huntington frem i Ukraine-debatten, det være sig Morten Uhrskov og Kasper Støvring, men noget af det bedste er pudsigt nok en Politiken-kronik af historiker Thomas Lie Eriksen, der problematiserer den sort/hvide fortælling om det gode EU og de onde russere.

Huntington lurer også lige bag overfladen, når Jyllands-Posten en sjælden gang strammer sig op, og skærer igennem politiserende floskler. Fra søndagens leder – Ukraine i klemme.

I Vesten har vi en forståelig, men ikke desto mindre forbløffende naiv tro på, at hvis en halv million mennesker i et land med en befolkning på 84 millioner indbyggere går på gaden og kræver et regimeskifte, så er der tale om en folkelig opstand, der har nationens opbakning. … Sejrherrerne på Uafhængighedspladsen i Kiev repræsenterer ikke hele Ukraine. … Udviklingen i det østlige og sydøstlige Ukraine, især på Krim, viser med al tragisk tydelighed, at ikke alle er begejstrede for magtskiftet i Kiev. For den russisk-sindede befolkning på halvøen kan det ikke gå hurtigt nok med at slippe fri af Kiev. … Hvis Ukraine skal undgå splittelse eller en borgerkrig, er den vestlige og østlige del af landet nødt til at finde en ny konsensus, der kan forene nationen. To nationale identiteter kolliderer i Ukraine.

Herunder en række citater relateret til Ukraine i Huntingtons bog.

“Paradigms also generate predictions, and a crucial test of paradigms’s validity and usefullness is the extent to which the predictions derived from it turn out to be more acurate than those from alternative paradigms. … A Civilizational approach… emphasizes the close cultural, personal, and historical links between Russia and Ukraine and the intermingling of Russians and Ukrainians in both countries, and focuses instead on the civilizational fault line that divides Orthodox eastern Ukraine from Uniate western Ukraine… a civilizationel approach… highlights the possibility of Ukraine splitting in half, a seperation which cultural factors would lead one to predict might be more violent than that of Czechoslovakia but far less bloody than that of Yougoslavia.” (s. 74f)

“The 1990s have seen the eruption of a global identity crisis. Almost everywhere one looks, people have been asking, ‘Who are we?’, ‘Where do we belong?’ and ‘Who is not us?’ These questions are central not only to peoples attempting to forge new nation states, as i the former Yugoslavia, but also much more generally. In the mid-1990s the countries where questions of national identity were actively debated included, among others: Algeria, Canada, China, Germany, Great Britain, India, Iran, Japan, Mexico, Marocco, Russia, South Africa, Syria, Tunesia, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United States. Identity issues are, of course, particularly intense in cleft countries that have sizable groups of people from different civilizations.

In coping with identity crisis, what counts for people are blood and belief, faith and family. People rally to those with similar ancestry, religion, language, values, and institutions and distance themselves from those with different ones.” (s. 323f)

Ukraine is divided between the Uniate nationalist Ukranian-speaking west and the Orthodox Russian-speaking east. In a clef country major groups from two or more civilizations say, in effect, ‘We are different peoples and belong in different places.’ The forces of repulsion drive them apart and they gravitate toward civilizational magnets in other societies. (s. 363f)

“The most compelling and pervasive answer to these questions is provided by the great historical line that has existed for centuries separating Western Christian peoples from Muslim and Orthodox peoples. This line dates back to the division of the Roman Empire in the fourth century and to the creation of the Holy Roman Empire in the tenth century. It has been in roughly its current place for at least five hundreds years. Beginning in the north, it runs along what are now the borders between Finland and Russia and the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and Russia, through western Belarus, through Ukraine separating the Uniate west from the Orthodox east, through Romania between Transylvania with its Catholic Hungarian population and the rest of the country, and through the former Yugoslavia along the border separating Slovenia and Croatia from the other republics. It is the cultural border of Europe, and in the post-Cold War world it is also the political and economic border of Europe and the West.

The civilizational paradigm thus provides a clear-cut and compelling answer to the question confronting West Europeans: Where does Europe end? Europe ends where Western Christianity ends and Islam and Orthodoxy begin. (s. 425f)

“The successor to the tsarist and communist empires is a civilizational bloc, paralleling in many respects that of the West in Europe. At the core, Russia, the equivalent of France and Germany, is closely linked to an inner circle including the two predominantly Slavic Orthodox republics of Belarus and Moldova, Kazakhstan, 40 percent of whose population is Russian, and Armenia, historically a close ally of Russia, In the mid-1990s all thse countries had pro-Russian governments which had generally come to power through elections. Close but more tenuous relations exist between Russia and Georgia (overwhelming Orthodox) and Ukraine (in large part Orthodox; but both of which also have strong sense of national identity and past independence. … Overall Russia is creating a bloc with a Orthodox heartland under its leadership and a surrounding buffer of relatively weak Islamic states which it will in varying degrees dominate and from which it will attempt to exclude the influence of other powers. Russia also expects the world to accept and to approve this system.” (s. 441ff)

“Belarus early joined the Commonwealth of Independent States, was a charter member of the economic union created in 1993 with Russia and Ukraine, agreed to a monetary union with Russia, surrrendered its nuclear weapons to Russia, and agreed to the stationing of Russian troops on its soil for the rest of this century. In 1995 Belarus was, in effect, part of Russia in all but name. … In these three states public opinion responding to some combination of strategic and economic interests produced governments favoring close alignment with Russia. A somewhat similar pattern eventually occurred in Ukraine.” (s. 445f)

“Apart from Russia the most populous and most important former Soviet republic is Ukraine. At various times in history Ukraine has been independent. Yet during most of the modern era it has been part of a political entity governed from Moscow. … Ukraine, however, is a cleft country with two distinct cultures. The civilizational fault line between the West and the Orthodoxy runs through its heart and has done so for centuries. … Historically, western Ukrainians have spoken Ukrainian and have been strongly nationalist in their outlook. The people of eastern Ukraine, on the other hand, have been overwhelmingly Orthodox and have in large part spoken Russian. … The Crimea is overwhelmingly Russian…” (s. 447ff)

“The differences between eastern and western Ukraine are manifest in the attitudes of their peoples. In late 1992, for instance, one-third of the Russians in western Ukraine as compared with only 10 percent in Kiev said they suffered from anti-Russian animosity. The east-west split was dramatically evident in the July 1994 presidential elections. The incumbent, Leonid Kravchuk, who despite working closely with Russia’s leaders identified himself as a nationalist, carried the thirteen provinces of the western Ukraine with majorities ranging up to over 90 percent. His opponent, Leonid Kuchma, who took Ukrainian speech lessons during the campaign, carried the thirteen eastern provinces by comparable majorities. Kuchma won with 52 percent of the vote. In effect, a slim majority of the Ukrainian public in 1994 confirmed Khmelnytsky’s choice in 1654. The election, as one American expert observed, ‘reflected, even crystallized, the split between Europeanized Slavs in western Ukraine and the Russo-Slav vision of what Ukraine should be. It’s not ethnic polarization so much as different cultures.

As a result of this division, the relations between Ukraine and Russia could develop in one of three ways. In the early 1990s, critically important issues existed between the two countries concerning nuclear weapons, Crimea, the rights of Russians in Ukraine, the Black Sea fleet, and economic relations. Many people thought armed conflict was likely, which led some Western analysts to argue that the West should support Ukraine’s having a nuclear arsenal to deter Russian aggression.

If civilization is what counts, however, violence between Ukrainians and Russians is unlikely. These are two Slavic, primarily Orthodox peoples who had close relationships for centuries and between whom intermarriage is common. Despite highly contentious issues and the pressure of extreme nationalists on both sides, the leaders of both countries worked hard and largely succesfully to moderate these disputes. The election of an explicitly Russian-oriented president in Ukraine in mid-1994 further reduced the probability of exacerbated conflict between the two countries.

A second and somewhat more likely possibility is that Ukraine could split along its fault line into two separate entities, the eastern of which would merge with Russia. The issue of secession first came up with respect to Crimea. The Crimean public, which is 70 percent Russian, substantially supported Ukrainian independence from the Soviet Union in a referendum in December 1991. In May 1992 the Crimean parliament also voted to declare independence from Ukraine and then, under Ukrainian pressure, rescinded that vote. The Russian parliament, however, voted to cancel the 1954 cession of Crimea to Ukraine. In Januar 1994 Crimeans elected a president who had campaigned on a platform of ‘unity with Russia.’ This stimulated some people to raise the question: ‘Will Crimea Be the Next Nagorno-Karabakh or Abkhazia?’ The answer was a resounding ‘No!’ as the new Crimean president backed away from his commitment to hold a referendum on independence and instead negotiated with the Kiev government. In may 1994 the situation heated up again when the Crimean parliament voted to restore the 1992 constitution which made it virtually independent of Ukraine. Once again, however, the restraint of Russian and Ukrainian leaders prevented this issue from generating violence, and the election two months later of the pro-Russian Kuchma as Ukrainian president undermined the Crimean thrust for secession.

The Election did, however, raise the possibility of the western part of the country seceding from a Ukraine that was drawing closer and closer to Russia. Some Russians might welcome this. As one Russian general put it, ‘Ukraine or rather Eastern Ukraine will come back in five, ten or fifteen years. Western Ukraine can go to hell!‘ Such a rump Uniate and Western-oriented Ukraine, however, would only be viable if it had strong and effective Western support. Such support is, in turn, likely to be forthcoming only if relations betweeen the West and Russia deteriated seriously and came to resemble those of the Cold War.” (s. 449ff)

(Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the remaking of World Order, 1996, Ebog, s. 450)

The third and more likely scenario is that Ukraine will remain united, remain cleft, remain independent, and generally cooperate closely with Russia. Once the transition questions concerning nuclear weapons and military forces are resolved, the most serious longer term issues will be economic, the resolution of which will be facilitated by a partially shared culture and close personal ties. The Russian-Ukrainian relationship is to eastern Europe, John Morrison has pointed out, what the Franco-German relationship is to western Europe. Just as the latter provides the core of the European Union, the former is the core essential to unity in the Orthodox world.” (s. 454f)

(The World of Civilizations: Post-1990, s. 45)

“… a consequence of the end of the Cold War and the need for a redefintion of the balance between Russia and the West and agreement by both sides on their basic equality and their respective spheres of influence. In practice this would mean:

1. Russian acceptance of the expansion of the European Union and NATO to include the Western Christian states of Central and Eastern Europe, and Western commitment not to expand NATO further, unless Ukraine splits into two countries;

2. a partnership treaty between Russia and NATO pledging nonaggression…

3. Western recognition of Russia as primarily responsible for the maintenance of security among Orthodox countries and in areas where Orthodoxy predominantes; …

If an arrangement emerges along these or similar lines, neither Russia nor the West is likely to pose any longer-term security challenge to the other.” (s. 63ff)

Oploadet Kl. 11:09 af Kim Møller — Direkte link14 kommentarer


15. september 2005

DR Udefra (6/9-05) – Revolution – Made in USA

I sidste uge havde DR Udefra overskriften Revolution – Made in USA, og den indkøbte dokumentar var en CBC Newsworld-produktion (canadisk) med orignaltitlen Anatomy of a Revolution.

Udsendelsen omhandlede demokratiske revolutioner i Serbien, Georgien og Ukraine, og der var lagt op til den helt store konspiration: USA planlagde og finansierede demokratiseringen. Det lød næsten for godt til at være sandt, men faktum var nu at det mere var NGO’ere end Bush-regeringen som havde mest ære af demokratiseringsprocessen.

Unge demokratisk-sindede fik økonomisk støtte i årevis, lige frem til den dag de anførte ikke særligt spontane demonstrationer der i sidste ende fjernede regimerne. Donorerne spændte fra Det Internationale Republikanske Institut og det overvejende republikanske Freedom House til den Bush-hadende milliardær Georg Soros og hans Open Society Institute.

Det at demokratiske bevægelser blev støttet af Vesten, skulle man være russisk politiker for at forstå det odiøse i – og derfor blev udsendelsen lidt tandløs.

Skræmmende var det dog at høre at Soros’ organisation mente at medierne var et vigtigt redskab til at mobilisere befolkningen. Georg Soros har via selvsamme institut finansieret MoveOn’s anti-Bush kampagne (dem med Bushitler-videoerne), og støtter eksempelvis via Center for American Progress organet Media Matters for America. Repræsentanter fra sidstnævnte organisation har været hyppige gæster i Udefra-dokumentarerne.

Da det hele ikke varede mere end godt 40 minutter var der rigeligt tid til debat, og gæsten Leif Davidsen var en behagelig overraskelse.

Han skar fint igennem, og skulle man med den Orange Revolution få associationer til den Cubanske ditto – så kunne han om den ukrainske variant fortælle at “de gør det jo ikke for selv at komme til magten”

Selv Tyge Petersen kunne ikke dreje det ind på noget grimt Bush havde gjort, og det blev blot til små lyserøde banaliteter: “Man kan vel også sige om den amerikanske indblanding at den er legitim…”.

Alt ialt en småkedelig let-produceret dokumentar uden politisk slagside. Altså noget nær det optimale tirsdag kl. 23.00 på DR2.

Oploadet Kl. 22:34 af Kim Møller — Direkte linkSkriv!


23. maj 2005

Ukraines ‘Orange revolution’ fejres med Che Guevara t-shirt foran 200 mio. tv-seere

Ukraine oplevede for nogle måneder siden noget så sjældent som en fredelig revolution med demokrati som slutmål. I lørdags afholdtes det internationale Melodi Grand Prix, og Ukraine deltog med en sang om landets Orange revolution. Hvad f…… tænkte forsangeren på?

Oploadet Kl. 18:53 af Kim Møller — Direkte link2 kommentarer
Denne weblog er læst af siden 22. juni 2003.

 



 

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