26. januar 2010

Ikke i medierne: “Support for Hamas was widespread… Opinions on Taliban were diverse.”

Da Lene Kühles og Lasse Lindekildes rapport om islamisk radikalisering var i medierne for et par uger siden, lagde Ritzaus Bureau linien med et referat under overskriften: Integration har nul effekt på ekstremisme. Undersøgelsen påviste at radikalisering fandt sted på tværs af socio-økonomiske variabler, og medierne kunne ligeså godt have skrevet at radikale, anti-demokratiske holdninger var mainstream i muslimske miljøer.

Det gjorde man ikke, for de interviewede mente ikke selv de var ekstreme, og som gode socialkonstruktivister, mente forskerne bag rapporten, at en etikette som radikal i sig selv medfører radikalisering. Rapportens tredie del har ‘De-radicalization Policies’ som emne, og så må problemet være vore definitioner, der ikke tager hensyn til muslimernes særlige frustration. En frustration, der selvfølgelig intet har med Koran-baseret ideologi at gøre.

På rapportens korte takkeliste, kan man læse, at forfatterne har fået hjælp af Karen-Lise ‘Det er ikke indholdet i Koranen, der er noget galt med’ Johansen. I gamle dage forsøgte forskere at forstå virkeligheden – i dag er samfundsforskningen ren formidling. Hvor vil vi hen – hvad skal vores konklusion lyde, for at nå der hen. Islam er fred. Hold masken, og håb det bedste.

Herunder nogle citater fra Radicalization among Young Muslims in Aarhus 148 s., pdf).

Om terrorisme.

“Many Aarhus Muslims have a Palestinian background, so it is not surprising that Hamas plays such a prominent role among Muslims in Aarhus. Hamas is a Palestinian organization, established in the 1930s with roots in the Muslim Brotherhood. It emerged as a distinct political movement in 1987… Support for Hamas was widespread among the interviewees… The particular support for Hamas was obviously grounded in the Palestinian presence in Aarhus. Hamas is considered a terrorist organization by EU/US authorities, and the Danish intelligence service, PET, explicitly mentions Hamas as an example of a terrorist organization. The categorization of Hamas is indeed a very complex thing.” (s. 47)

“Taliban, an Afghan movement, literately meaning the students, emerged in 1994, took over Afghan government in 1996 and ruled until they were expelled from power by US forces in 2001. After their removal from power, Taliban has been fighting a guerilla war against US and NATO forces (including Danish troops) and has recently experienced resurgence also in Pakistan. Opinions on Taliban were diverse. Some interviewees supported Taliban whole-heartedly… (s. 48f)

“Al-Shabaab, literately meaning ‘the youth’, is a recent Somali movement, erected from the breakdown of the Islamic Courts Union, which ruled parts of Somalia for six months in 2006. After the defeat of the Islamic Courts Union by the Transitional Federal Government backed by Ethiopian forces, factions from the Islamic Courts Union joined the more militant Al-Shabaab in a guerilla-style organization, attempting to regain power in Somalia. Al-Shabaab has claimed affiliation with Al Qaeda since 2007, and Al-Shabaab and Al Qaeda have apparently pulled together to declare the struggle to expel Ethiopian forces from Somalia. Experts find, however, that the link between Al-Shabaab and Al Qaeda is weak, if existing at all, and perhaps more of a move to attract wider support for the Somali cause. Nonetheless this affiliation has earned Al-Shabaab a position on the US list of terrorist organizations… Asked about the support for Al-Shabaab among Somalis in Denmark, one interview person, thus, explained how Al-Shabaab has lost much of its former popularity among Somalis…:” (s. 50f)

“Though almost all Muslim interviewees to some extent supported one or more of the or-ganizations regarded as terrorist organizations, it is important to emphasize that this support is firstly conditional on a feeling that the militancy is not excessive, but that only the necessary amount of violence is used and that civilians as far as possible are left unhurt.” (s. 54, Conditions for support)

“An overwhelming majority of the interviewees to a certain extent found terrorist actions acceptable in the conflicts of the Muslim world.” (s. 57)

Om anti-demokratiske holdninger.

“In relation to the general discussion of the presence of undemocratic or antidemocratic sympathies, the general conclusion is that some of the interviewees hold undemocratic convictions. They considered it to be haram, forbidden, to vote in elections and some of them also have problems with other aspects of Danish society, for instance taxpaying. The convictions were not always that deep-felt, and were not anti-democratic. It was not the democratic society as such that was a problem, but the fact that it was not Islamic. Some of the Muslims who most strongly felt the need to live in an Islamic state had plans to emigrate. Others looked for ways to accommodate their problems with democracy, because they wanted to stay in Denmark.” (s. 67)

“Our main result is that if we accept the defining properties of radicalization in official definitions, in particular the defining properties of ‘acceptance/support of terrorism’ and ‘undemocratic means/goals’, then there are indeed many ‘radicals’ among the interviewed members of the ASC Islamic activist milieu in Aarhus. However, we also found that if we listen to the categories, distinctions and conditions put forward by Muslims themselves there are good reasons to modify and specify these defining properties.

We found that almost all Muslim interviewees to some extent accepted or supported the actions and/or goals of different organizations such as Hamas, Taliban and Al-Shabaab, which are found on lists of terrorist organizations in the West. The differences in opinion between Muslim interviewees inside and outside of the ASC milieu were on this matter not prefound, but ideological support for Taliban was only found within the milieu.

Likewise, we found that many, but not all of the interviewees within the ASC milieu (in contrast to Muslims interviewees outside the milieu) held some sort of undemocratic attitudes. When confronted with the hypothetical choice between living in a society based on democracy or an Islamic state based on the divine rules of God implemented through Sharia, many chose the latter. This result – that there are many ‘radicals’ in the Muslim activist milieu in Aarhus – is in sharp contrast to the perceptions among the interviewed young Muslims, imams and religious authorities, and social workers, who describe radicalization as a very marginal and distant problem…

What the Danish Secret Service sees as a threat – the young man talking about jihad and bin Laden I don’t see as threat. I can show you 2600 of those in my home village in Pakistan and several dozen here in Denmark. They talk like that. But they don’t mean anything by it. It is not rooted in real ideological beliefs, but more in despair and a sense of crisis…” (s. 67f)

“Our position here is that we cannot just overhear all the conditions for accepting violence as a means put forward by interviewees. If we do that we will lump together a widespread sense of injustice in relation to the situations in, for example, Palestine, Afghanistan, Somalia and Iraq among Muslims, and non-Muslims, with the very rare support of indiscriminate killings of civilians in the West by e.g. Al Qaeda. This cannot be expedient, neither from an academic nor from a policy perspective. Too many details and distinctions are lost, and we put Muslims in a difficult situation of not being able to support or accept the fighting of e.g. Hamas without being labeled as ‘radicals’ who pose a potential danger to the democratic order in Denmark.

On the other hand, if we accept that a distinction is necessary in the defining properties of radicalization, between support or acceptance of violence in defensive warlike situations in Muslim countries, and violence imposed in an indiscriminate manner against civilians in non-Muslim countries, we realize that radicalization in the West should not be seen as a mere spillover of conflicts in the Middle East as sometimes suggested. The vast majority of Muslims make a clear distinction between the two, and support or acceptance of defensive violence in the Muslim countries do not lead to acceptance or support of violence against civilians in the West. We believe this is an important insight, which has to be reflected in the way we define radicalization.

Secondly, we found that several Muslims in the ASC milieu held undemocratic attitudes, in the sense that they did not participate actively in elections for ideological reasons, and that they would hypothetically prefer to live in an Islamic state based on Sharia rather than a society rooted in a democratic constitution. However, none were actively anti-democratic in the sense that they were actively working towards the implementation of Sharia or the creation of an Islamic state in Denmark, nor did anybody think this was a realistic or even a desirable goal. The fight for a truly Islamic state should be fought where Muslims are in the majority, and without the use of force. Thus, anti-democratic activities were only seen as legitimate when they were sanctioned by the majority of people in the involved territory, as it e.g. happened in Somalia. Paradoxically, anti-democratic activities and goals had to be democratically sanctioned to be legitimate in the eyes of most inter-viewees.” (s. 70)

Om moskeer og social kontrol.

“Although our interviewees generally did not perceive the concept of radicalization to be the most useful tool for addressing problems, some of them did find that there were problems in the Muslim community with issues of social control and religious bullying. One interviewee, working in a local youth club, described a concrete situation:

A: We had a group of young men who stopped the girls who wanted to attend one of our parties for girls here at the club. This was two-three years ago. They were hang-ing around outside and were pushing the girls not to attend parties, and trying to convince them to stay at home… they said that the girls were like their sisters, and that they did not want them to go to parties, because it would harm the girls, as people would start to talk bad about them, people would gossip…

Such attempts at social control – the application of social pressures to achieve a certain type of behavior in other people – were described in a handful of our interviews. However, that social control is a widespread problem is claimed in a recent study of equality among Muslim women in Denmark:

One issue can be identified, which all respondents have had to deal with: Social control. Some have internalized this way of thinking, and have maybe started exercising social control, others have wanted to criticize such practice, but have not dared. A few have broken away from social control and have experienced deep conflicts with family and other networks, conflicts which have cost social exclusion and in some cases violence. Social control is an important issue from the perspective of equality as boys do not seem to be subject to the same control, but are rather to large extent the ones who exercise the control (Maïa Consult 2009: 206, our translation).

It is typical for the descriptions of social control in our interviews, however, that such control and religious bullying are seen as phenomena that were more common 3-5 years ago in Aarhus than today. In fact, most of the instances described refer to the period when Shaykh Raed Hlayhel was an influential imam in Gjellerup. More often than not Shaykh Raed, or his close companions, was mentioned as the source of the social pressures… One interviewee told how Shaykh Raed and his followers had a practice of making home visits to families who they believed were not coming to mosque often enough and try to convince them to come to mosque more regularly. The interviewee did not consider this undue pressure… When asked about it, all our interviewees dismissed that any imam or other religious authority in Aarhus today had the same status or influence as Shaykh Raed had before he left Aarhus. Many said that there is no religious ‘controller’ in the community today who is able to use their position and authority to exercise social control.

The kind of social controlling and religious bullying described above is from the perspective of equality and freedom of choice a serious social problem. In a community where social group pressures are widespread, fear and coercion develop… It is important to recognize that social control and group pressure based on religion are not particular Muslim phenomena… Social control has also characterized, and to some ex-tent still does, some communities, e.g. small rural communities also in Lutheran Protes-tant Denmark.” (s. 71ff)


  • 15/1-10 Uriasposten – Ikke islam der radikaliserer, men...
  • 21/1-10 Uriasposten – Lene Kühle om ‘ikke-radikale’ anti-demokrater der bifalder terror...
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    1. Det er da godt, at de har skatteyderne til at betale for den gang hvidvaskning. Hvis almindelige mennesker skulle bestemme, ville de ikke have penge til tryksværten – ikke engang elektroner :)

      Kommentar by Henrik R Clausen — 26. januar 2010 @ 17:35

    2. Åh nej, sætter vi muslimer i et kedeligt dilemma når vi vil kalde dem radikale fordi de støtter terror?

      De små pus!


      Kommentar by Henrik — 26. januar 2010 @ 17:36

    3. Danmark er en rede med små vittige fugle, der vimser rundt og fodrer og fodrer og fodrer på en stor fed klam snyltende og voldsforbryderisk og narkotisk og anti-intelektuel burkaklædt gøgeunge: Islam.

      Hvorfor ser vi det ikke?

      Af samme grund som spurvene: Vi er forblændet af vores instinkt.

      Kommentar by Nanoligator — 26. januar 2010 @ 17:38

    4. Enig i dine indledende bemærkninger, Kim Møller. Man bliver helt trekantet i hovedet af alt det “på den ene side og på den anden side”-tomgang, der hvergang bagatelliserer selv temmelig rabiate udsagn og holdninger. Her gør nazi-testen underværker – mon de ville vise samme forståelse for nazi-Jonni og hans kammerater? Næppe. Det virker ikke som om materialet er analyseret til bunds eller de forstår det ikke? Deres perspektiveringer virker underligt forudindtagede. Datagrundlaget refereres overhovedet ikke og det meste er – tror jeg – noget de kunne have skrevet uden at lave undersøgelsen. Undersøgelsen er (ligesom den komiske Burka-rapport, i øvrigt) baseret på kvalitative interviews og det giver alle muligheder for godtkøbssnak baseret på egne forudfattede meninger uden bund i empirisk sikre data. Metoden beskriver de sådan:
      “A combination of multiple methods was chosen for this study. First, the core of empirical material presented in this report derives from 39 interviews with 45 people conducted in spring 2009 (see Appendix 1). Most of the interviews were taped, but five were for differ-ent reasons not. Three interviews were conducted over the phone while the rest were face-to-face interviews.” De virker ikke som trænede researchere, men som sludrechartoller med rigtige meninger. Det vi i gamle dage kaldte “lavmålsforskere”, der blev ansat i bundter, hvis de havde de rigtige meninger gerne marxistisk inspirerede.

      Kommentar by anti-marx anno dazumal — 26. januar 2010 @ 17:53

    5. De lader da ihvertfald enhver tvivl komme muslimer til gode.

      Mon det ville fungere på samme måde hvis det var en undersøgelse af “tolerance”, “fremmedhad”, “racisme”, “nationalisme” blandt hvide kristne borgere ???

      Kommentar by Superman — 26. januar 2010 @ 18:23

    6. 5. kolonnen marcherer…både de leverpostejfarvede og de “eksotiske”

      Kommentar by Nosferatu — 26. januar 2010 @ 18:53

    7. Noget andet er at ingen journalister (gider/må) læse andet end sammendrag. Det er jo en af grundene til at man har blogs.

      Kommentar by NielsC — 26. januar 2010 @ 21:05

    8. Offtopic

      US delegation in Cairo, as Egypt decries foreign interference in Nagaa Hammadi affair

      “Meanwhile Egypt insisted that the Nagaa Hammadi killings — in which six Copts and a Muslim guard were killed in a drive-by shooting outside a church on the Coptic Christmas Eve — was a purely internal matter and criticized certain members of the European Parliament for attempting to push a resolution on the incident.

      A statement by the Foreign Ministry Friday said, “It is an internal Egyptian matter that no foreign party is allowed to consider.””


      PA rejects European Parliament statement on Egypt’s religious minorities

      “The Foreign Relations Committee of the People’s Assembly (PA) rejected the statement issued by the European Parliament (EP) regarding the Nagaa Hammadi killings when it convened late on Monday.

      Members of the committee argued that Europe was not in a position to pass judgment due to violations against freedom of belief in its own backyard. House speaker Ahmed Fathi Sorour, who chaired the meeting, said that the statement from the EP was completely rejected.”


      Kommentar by BE — 27. januar 2010 @ 01:41

    9. 8.BE


      Næe, men den islamiske sang har vi hørt før.

      Teksterne vil nok lyde lidt anderledes OM EU stoppede med de månedlige/årlige indbetalinger til de Egyptiske konti !

      Disse er i årevis blevet tilført enorme summer fra EU – betalt af de vantro europæere, som desværre ikke aner en snus om hvad der overføres af kolossale summer til de arabisk-islamiske Middelhavslande.

      Angående rapporten så lader den ingen tvivl tilbage om, at udfaldet skulle passe til nogle forventninger som må have ligget i luften!

      Forskerne har vel også haft deres egne karrierer i baghovederne, mon ikke ?

      Kommentar by Vivi Andersen — 27. januar 2010 @ 19:37

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