5. marts 2014

Samuel P. Huntington om Ukraines kulturelle splittelse (’96): “The forces of repulsion drive them apart…”

Alle har en mening om konflikten i Ukraine, og det virker som det politiske etablissement tror man kan tale en vestlig universalisme frem, stik imod historiske erfaringer og geopolitisk virkelighed. I sidste ende handler det om kultur. Samuel P. Huntington satte ord på kulturens betydning i storværket The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996), hvor han blandt andet beskrev hvorledes Ukraine var et splittet land, qua sin beliggenhed på brudfladen mellem det vestlig-katolske Europa og det østlig-ortodokse Rusland.

Enkelte debattører har trukket Huntington frem i Ukraine-debatten, det være sig Morten Uhrskov og Kasper Støvring, men noget af det bedste er pudsigt nok en Politiken-kronik af historiker Thomas Lie Eriksen, der problematiserer den sort/hvide fortælling om det gode EU og de onde russere.

Huntington lurer også lige bag overfladen, når Jyllands-Posten en sjælden gang strammer sig op, og skærer igennem politiserende floskler. Fra søndagens leder – Ukraine i klemme.

I Vesten har vi en forståelig, men ikke desto mindre forbløffende naiv tro på, at hvis en halv million mennesker i et land med en befolkning på 84 millioner indbyggere går på gaden og kræver et regimeskifte, så er der tale om en folkelig opstand, der har nationens opbakning. … Sejrherrerne på Uafhængighedspladsen i Kiev repræsenterer ikke hele Ukraine. … Udviklingen i det østlige og sydøstlige Ukraine, især på Krim, viser med al tragisk tydelighed, at ikke alle er begejstrede for magtskiftet i Kiev. For den russisk-sindede befolkning på halvøen kan det ikke gå hurtigt nok med at slippe fri af Kiev. … Hvis Ukraine skal undgå splittelse eller en borgerkrig, er den vestlige og østlige del af landet nødt til at finde en ny konsensus, der kan forene nationen. To nationale identiteter kolliderer i Ukraine.

Herunder en række citater relateret til Ukraine i Huntingtons bog.

“Paradigms also generate predictions, and a crucial test of paradigms’s validity and usefullness is the extent to which the predictions derived from it turn out to be more acurate than those from alternative paradigms. … A Civilizational approach… emphasizes the close cultural, personal, and historical links between Russia and Ukraine and the intermingling of Russians and Ukrainians in both countries, and focuses instead on the civilizational fault line that divides Orthodox eastern Ukraine from Uniate western Ukraine… a civilizationel approach… highlights the possibility of Ukraine splitting in half, a seperation which cultural factors would lead one to predict might be more violent than that of Czechoslovakia but far less bloody than that of Yougoslavia.” (s. 74f)

“The 1990s have seen the eruption of a global identity crisis. Almost everywhere one looks, people have been asking, ‘Who are we?’, ‘Where do we belong?’ and ‘Who is not us?’ These questions are central not only to peoples attempting to forge new nation states, as i the former Yugoslavia, but also much more generally. In the mid-1990s the countries where questions of national identity were actively debated included, among others: Algeria, Canada, China, Germany, Great Britain, India, Iran, Japan, Mexico, Marocco, Russia, South Africa, Syria, Tunesia, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United States. Identity issues are, of course, particularly intense in cleft countries that have sizable groups of people from different civilizations.

In coping with identity crisis, what counts for people are blood and belief, faith and family. People rally to those with similar ancestry, religion, language, values, and institutions and distance themselves from those with different ones.” (s. 323f)

Ukraine is divided between the Uniate nationalist Ukranian-speaking west and the Orthodox Russian-speaking east. In a clef country major groups from two or more civilizations say, in effect, ‘We are different peoples and belong in different places.’ The forces of repulsion drive them apart and they gravitate toward civilizational magnets in other societies. (s. 363f)

“The most compelling and pervasive answer to these questions is provided by the great historical line that has existed for centuries separating Western Christian peoples from Muslim and Orthodox peoples. This line dates back to the division of the Roman Empire in the fourth century and to the creation of the Holy Roman Empire in the tenth century. It has been in roughly its current place for at least five hundreds years. Beginning in the north, it runs along what are now the borders between Finland and Russia and the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) and Russia, through western Belarus, through Ukraine separating the Uniate west from the Orthodox east, through Romania between Transylvania with its Catholic Hungarian population and the rest of the country, and through the former Yugoslavia along the border separating Slovenia and Croatia from the other republics. It is the cultural border of Europe, and in the post-Cold War world it is also the political and economic border of Europe and the West.

The civilizational paradigm thus provides a clear-cut and compelling answer to the question confronting West Europeans: Where does Europe end? Europe ends where Western Christianity ends and Islam and Orthodoxy begin. (s. 425f)

“The successor to the tsarist and communist empires is a civilizational bloc, paralleling in many respects that of the West in Europe. At the core, Russia, the equivalent of France and Germany, is closely linked to an inner circle including the two predominantly Slavic Orthodox republics of Belarus and Moldova, Kazakhstan, 40 percent of whose population is Russian, and Armenia, historically a close ally of Russia, In the mid-1990s all thse countries had pro-Russian governments which had generally come to power through elections. Close but more tenuous relations exist between Russia and Georgia (overwhelming Orthodox) and Ukraine (in large part Orthodox; but both of which also have strong sense of national identity and past independence. … Overall Russia is creating a bloc with a Orthodox heartland under its leadership and a surrounding buffer of relatively weak Islamic states which it will in varying degrees dominate and from which it will attempt to exclude the influence of other powers. Russia also expects the world to accept and to approve this system.” (s. 441ff)

“Belarus early joined the Commonwealth of Independent States, was a charter member of the economic union created in 1993 with Russia and Ukraine, agreed to a monetary union with Russia, surrrendered its nuclear weapons to Russia, and agreed to the stationing of Russian troops on its soil for the rest of this century. In 1995 Belarus was, in effect, part of Russia in all but name. … In these three states public opinion responding to some combination of strategic and economic interests produced governments favoring close alignment with Russia. A somewhat similar pattern eventually occurred in Ukraine.” (s. 445f)

“Apart from Russia the most populous and most important former Soviet republic is Ukraine. At various times in history Ukraine has been independent. Yet during most of the modern era it has been part of a political entity governed from Moscow. … Ukraine, however, is a cleft country with two distinct cultures. The civilizational fault line between the West and the Orthodoxy runs through its heart and has done so for centuries. … Historically, western Ukrainians have spoken Ukrainian and have been strongly nationalist in their outlook. The people of eastern Ukraine, on the other hand, have been overwhelmingly Orthodox and have in large part spoken Russian. … The Crimea is overwhelmingly Russian…” (s. 447ff)

“The differences between eastern and western Ukraine are manifest in the attitudes of their peoples. In late 1992, for instance, one-third of the Russians in western Ukraine as compared with only 10 percent in Kiev said they suffered from anti-Russian animosity. The east-west split was dramatically evident in the July 1994 presidential elections. The incumbent, Leonid Kravchuk, who despite working closely with Russia’s leaders identified himself as a nationalist, carried the thirteen provinces of the western Ukraine with majorities ranging up to over 90 percent. His opponent, Leonid Kuchma, who took Ukrainian speech lessons during the campaign, carried the thirteen eastern provinces by comparable majorities. Kuchma won with 52 percent of the vote. In effect, a slim majority of the Ukrainian public in 1994 confirmed Khmelnytsky’s choice in 1654. The election, as one American expert observed, ‘reflected, even crystallized, the split between Europeanized Slavs in western Ukraine and the Russo-Slav vision of what Ukraine should be. It’s not ethnic polarization so much as different cultures.

As a result of this division, the relations between Ukraine and Russia could develop in one of three ways. In the early 1990s, critically important issues existed between the two countries concerning nuclear weapons, Crimea, the rights of Russians in Ukraine, the Black Sea fleet, and economic relations. Many people thought armed conflict was likely, which led some Western analysts to argue that the West should support Ukraine’s having a nuclear arsenal to deter Russian aggression.

If civilization is what counts, however, violence between Ukrainians and Russians is unlikely. These are two Slavic, primarily Orthodox peoples who had close relationships for centuries and between whom intermarriage is common. Despite highly contentious issues and the pressure of extreme nationalists on both sides, the leaders of both countries worked hard and largely succesfully to moderate these disputes. The election of an explicitly Russian-oriented president in Ukraine in mid-1994 further reduced the probability of exacerbated conflict between the two countries.

A second and somewhat more likely possibility is that Ukraine could split along its fault line into two separate entities, the eastern of which would merge with Russia. The issue of secession first came up with respect to Crimea. The Crimean public, which is 70 percent Russian, substantially supported Ukrainian independence from the Soviet Union in a referendum in December 1991. In May 1992 the Crimean parliament also voted to declare independence from Ukraine and then, under Ukrainian pressure, rescinded that vote. The Russian parliament, however, voted to cancel the 1954 cession of Crimea to Ukraine. In Januar 1994 Crimeans elected a president who had campaigned on a platform of ‘unity with Russia.’ This stimulated some people to raise the question: ‘Will Crimea Be the Next Nagorno-Karabakh or Abkhazia?’ The answer was a resounding ‘No!’ as the new Crimean president backed away from his commitment to hold a referendum on independence and instead negotiated with the Kiev government. In may 1994 the situation heated up again when the Crimean parliament voted to restore the 1992 constitution which made it virtually independent of Ukraine. Once again, however, the restraint of Russian and Ukrainian leaders prevented this issue from generating violence, and the election two months later of the pro-Russian Kuchma as Ukrainian president undermined the Crimean thrust for secession.

The Election did, however, raise the possibility of the western part of the country seceding from a Ukraine that was drawing closer and closer to Russia. Some Russians might welcome this. As one Russian general put it, ‘Ukraine or rather Eastern Ukraine will come back in five, ten or fifteen years. Western Ukraine can go to hell!‘ Such a rump Uniate and Western-oriented Ukraine, however, would only be viable if it had strong and effective Western support. Such support is, in turn, likely to be forthcoming only if relations betweeen the West and Russia deteriated seriously and came to resemble those of the Cold War.” (s. 449ff)

(Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the remaking of World Order, 1996, Ebog, s. 450)

The third and more likely scenario is that Ukraine will remain united, remain cleft, remain independent, and generally cooperate closely with Russia. Once the transition questions concerning nuclear weapons and military forces are resolved, the most serious longer term issues will be economic, the resolution of which will be facilitated by a partially shared culture and close personal ties. The Russian-Ukrainian relationship is to eastern Europe, John Morrison has pointed out, what the Franco-German relationship is to western Europe. Just as the latter provides the core of the European Union, the former is the core essential to unity in the Orthodox world.” (s. 454f)

(The World of Civilizations: Post-1990, s. 45)

“… a consequence of the end of the Cold War and the need for a redefintion of the balance between Russia and the West and agreement by both sides on their basic equality and their respective spheres of influence. In practice this would mean:

1. Russian acceptance of the expansion of the European Union and NATO to include the Western Christian states of Central and Eastern Europe, and Western commitment not to expand NATO further, unless Ukraine splits into two countries;

2. a partnership treaty between Russia and NATO pledging nonaggression…

3. Western recognition of Russia as primarily responsible for the maintenance of security among Orthodox countries and in areas where Orthodoxy predominantes; …

If an arrangement emerges along these or similar lines, neither Russia nor the West is likely to pose any longer-term security challenge to the other.” (s. 63ff)

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  1. EU og USA betalte bøllerne for at gå på gaden ca. 100kr. om dagen. http://www.paulcraigroberts.org/2014/02/17/us-eu-paying-ukrainian-rioters-protesters-paul-craig-roberts/
    Det er sgu grotesk. Gadens parlament er nu blevet en del af Vestens demokrati-begreb. Jeg græmmes.

    Kommentar by CommonSenseNow — 5. marts 2014 @ 12:53

  2. Løsningen burde være at Ukraine deles i to og Vesten derefter holder dilleren ude af Ruslands sfære.

    Men EU søger uafbrudt ekspansion, i Østeuropa og i Mellemøsten-Nordafrika. Det kan kun ende galt, ja er det for så vidt allerede.

    Kommentar by Ich bin Allah (Akbar) — 5. marts 2014 @ 13:25

  3. I papirudgaven af “Civilisationernes sammenstød” står der på forsiden øverst et uddrag af en anmeldelse i Politiken.

    “Et uomgængeligt bud på en forklaringsmodel til det 21. århundrede… Hvis ikke det er civilisationernes sammenstød, vi oplever i disse år, hvad er det så?” Politiken.

    Bogen (2006/2007) slutter med et interview af Huntington ved Noa Redington.

    Kommentar by Ole S. — 5. marts 2014 @ 13:54

  4. 1 CSN,

    Greenpiss går heller ikke af vejen for anvendelsen af sub-contractors, hvilket de beviseligt gjorde i en aktion mod genmodificeret ris i Bicol på Filippinerne. Men hvem har sendt og betalt Greenpiss? De lokale bøller fik cirka kr. 50 for endags “arbejde”, hvilket trods alt, og alt taget i betragtning, er bedre end betalingen i Ukraine.

    Og på samme vis, kan man jo forestille sig, at Kirkeasyl er en aktion der er købt og betalt for. Omend der næppe er blevet givet andet end et band til en fest eller noget i den retning til personerne på gaden. Men det udelukker ikke, at Enhedslisten/SF har været ude i en kontrakt med en sheik, der har givet et solidt bidrag som tak for indsatsen.

    Kommentar by Hans Und — 5. marts 2014 @ 14:09

  5. Split denne failed state op i to via en fredelig folkeafstemning. Men lad endelig ikke den vestlige del komme ind i EU (naturligvis medmindre Danmark forlader foreningen).
    Bemærk bnp/indbygger i Ukraine og sammenlign det med fx Grækenlands. En himmelvid forskel og et bundløst hul i Eu’s kasse. Langt større end PIIGS-landene.

    Kommentar by Henrik Petersen — 5. marts 2014 @ 15:56

  6. Den Største EU-løgn….
    ….er så enorm og virkelighedsfjern, nemlig at det er på grund af EU-cirkussets afdankede politikeres ”Ansvarlighed” at vi har haft noget de kalder ”FRED” i Europa, de sidste mange år, både EUerne og de fleste af vore ”Christiansborgere” må lide af fremskreden Døvblindhed og Hjernesvind, når eller hvis de læser, ser nyheder eller bare bor i nærheden af et ghettoområde, hvor politi, brandvæsen og ambulancer angribes og formenes adgang.

    Daglige uprovokerede overfald, knivstikkeri, skyderi, mord, voldtægter indbrud narko, ja det er kun fantasien der sætter grænsen for den kriminalitet denne pest af uintegrerbare Muhamedanere og de øvrige Østeuropæiske velfærdsturister, alt sammen påbudt os og de øvrige gamle Europæiske Stater.
    Løgnen er så stor at ikke engang Adolf Hitlers Propagandaminister Joseph Göbbels ville turde bruge den, så let gennemskuelig er den.

    Vi kender også typen på storhedsvanvid, vor Udenrigsminister denne Nullitet, Martin Lidegaard, sidder og hælder vand ud af ørerne og vil både true og give gode råd til Putin i Ukraine, som om han tror Putin så meget som rynker panden, nej han skriger af grin, denne naragtige ”Solcellefiasko” kan overhovedet ikke skræmme nogen eller noget som helst, men må nøjes med at være topmålt ”nyttig Idiot” indtil han som nullitet får et skub mere opad til måske Statsminister eller EUkommissær, jo mere idiot desto større chancer for avancementer.

    – og ikke mindst med et nært familiemedlem på Den Danske udgave af ”Der Sturmer” så får Landsforræderiets vanvid frit løb.

    Kommentar by Cantor — 5. marts 2014 @ 19:26

  7. Danmark tabte krigen i 1864, men som resultat af dette tab af land gik man igang med at opdyrke heden under Dalgas motto “Hvad udad tabes må indad vindes”
    Tænk hvis man kunne eksportere den ide mod øst!
    For det er da fantastisk at Rusland i bedste sovjetimperialistiske stil forsøger at expandere i alle retninger, samtidig med at man råder over verdens største territorium og naturressourcer men udnytter det så dårligt at den almindelige russer er ludfattig. Russerne kunne jo være mindst lige så rige som nordmændene hvis de bare styrede deres land en smule fornuftigt!

    Naturligvis har Ukraine svære problemer af mange slags, men de bør ikke løses ved at en fremmed magt invaderer landet eller dele af det!

    Kommentar by Jens Hansen — 5. marts 2014 @ 23:47

  8. Huntington var langt forud for sin tid … hans analyse af Tyrkiets skifte fra Kemalisme til Islamisme var spot-on. “Clash of Civilizations … ” burde være pligt læsning i samfundsfag.

    Kommentar by Jan — 6. marts 2014 @ 00:48

  9. Tak, meget interessant artikel.

    Jeg gad vide hvordan problemet med jernbane-sporvidden dem og os imellem skal løses? Ex-sovjet + Finland kører på 8,5 cm bredere spor (1520/1524 mm = russisk bredspor) end vi gør (1435 mm = normal- eller standardspor), og af tekniske grunde findes der ingen kompromis (som fx 3-skinnespor).

    Desuden er indtrykket, at russerne fremmer deres uforenlige, forstyrrende sporvidde på aggressiv måde. Fx vil de udvide en eksisterende linie fra Ukraine til det østlige Slovaki, videre til Wien, og nu tilmed til Italien, mens de samtidigt blokkerer samtlige forsøg at få normalsporlinier bygt på deres territorium, eller i en af deres klientstater.

    Det ville nemlig forenkle transporten signifikant hvis Kina (Korea, Japan, evt Amerika…) og Polen ville forbindes ved en normalsporlinie over russisk område. Nyttig ville også være en gren fra Moskva til St Petersburg, således at Estland og Finland kunne tilsluttes.

    Den her aspekt nævnes praktisk taget aldrig (tabu-emne), men er naturligvis yderst vigtig.

    Kommentar by Michael Laudahn — 6. marts 2014 @ 08:27

  10. Det, der ikke rigtig passer, er når han fx siger: ‘…separating Western Christian peoples from Muslim and Orthodox peoples’, således som om muhammedanere og ortodokse kristne var ligesom på samme niveau. Kig på den russiske historie, og hvis bare den seneste, og du ser at modsætningerne dem imellem næppe er mindre end mellem os og muhammedanerne.

    Kommentar by Michael Laudahn — 6. marts 2014 @ 10:12

  11. […] med skam at melde ikke, hvad Huntington skrev om Ukraine. Men på Uriasposten bragte man i går fyldige citater fra bogen, hvori Huntington med syvtommersøm altså slog fast, at Ukraine ville blive fremtidens store […]

    Pingback by Sarah Palins klarsyn | Reaktionære Refleksioner — 6. marts 2014 @ 11:49

  12. Huntington er ildeset hos de marxistiske samfundsforskere, som stadig sidder på samfundsforskningen.

    Det er fordi hans analyse tager udgangspunkt i kulturer dvs de grundlæggende værdier, der bestemmer folks normer og holdninger.

    Altsammen den sociologi marxisterne fejede til side med klassekampen og kapitalismens uundgåelige sammenbrud pga den faldende profitrate.

    Det gik imidlertid ikke som præsterne prædikede og i stedet brød kommunismen sammen og lejrene og massegravene kom frem i lyset.

    I dækningen af Ukraine var automatreaktionen hos de dominerende statsejede massemedier i starten den sædvanlige reflex og jeg forventede næsten at de ville flytte nyhedsredaktionerne ned på Uafhængighedspladsen i Kiev, som de i sin tid flyttede nyhedsredaktionerne ned på Tahrir Pladsen i Cairo under ‘den egyptiske revolution’, som de også fejltolkede 100%.

    Disse fejlvurderinger fra de røde lejesvende skyldes, at de intet har lært af historien og deres uvidenhed bakkes op af de fallerede marxistiske universitets forskere.

    Også historie outsideren, Bent Jensen, taler for døve øren og nedgøres rutinemæssigt af de røde forskere og journalister. Det er imidlertid en sand fornøjelse for mig at læse – indtil videre de første 200 sider – af hans gennemgang af de rødes fejltagelser og forræderi under den kolde krig i “Ulve, får og vogtere”. Stor tak til Jesper Langballe og DF for at gøre det muligt. (Man savner det spørgsmål til de røde, der forsøgte at få projektet stoppet: Mener I stadig at Bent Jensens forskningsprojekt skulle have været stoppet?

    Hvorfor er de troende marxister så vedholden og hvorfor vil de ikke lære af historien? Måske tror de stadig på marxismens utopi og mener, at de kan nøjes med at kende de 5 marxistiske staveplader?

    Kommentar by A-mad — 6. marts 2014 @ 14:13

  13. Huntington står generelt bekræftet her. Problemet er ikke om Krim og Øst-ukraine vil være russisk. Problemet er at Rusland tromlede ind over grænsen i bedste “Hitler-ind-i-Prag” stil og det får os til at se temmeligt kastrerede ud hvis vi ikke reagerer. Det er lidt som at snakke med en pige i en bar og så kommer hendes kæreste og smider sin drink i hovedet på dig. Så handler det ikke om at hun er hans og ikke din kæreste længere…

    Kommentar by Morani ya Simba — 7. marts 2014 @ 20:50

  14. Jeg tænker på, at de gode står uden for Ugandas ambassade men protesterer nogen mod Putins invasion på Krim? Ikke så vidt jeg har set/hørt!
    Hold da op hvor er vi slappe i koderne!

    Kommentar by Britta Due Andersen — 7. marts 2014 @ 22:09

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